Stephen F. Austin State University

SFA ScholarWorks
Faculty Publications

Business Communication and Legal Studies

Spring 2014

Arbitration Agreements, Expanded Judicial Review, and
Preemption – Hall Street Associates and NAFTA Traders, Inc. – A
National Debate with International Implications
J. Keaton Grubbs
Nelson Rusche College of Business, Stephen F. Austin State University

Justin Blount
Nelson Rusche College of Business, Stephen F. Austin State University, blountjr@sfasu.edu

Kyle Post
Nelson Rusche College of Business, Stephen F. Austin State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/businesscom_facultypubs
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Tell us how this article helped you.
Repository Citation
Grubbs, J. Keaton; Blount, Justin; and Post, Kyle, "Arbitration Agreements, Expanded Judicial Review, and
Preemption – Hall Street Associates and NAFTA Traders, Inc. – A National Debate with International
Implications" (2014). Faculty Publications. 62.
https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/businesscom_facultypubs/62

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business Communication and Legal Studies at SFA
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SFA
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu.

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, EXPANDED JUDICIAL
REVIEW, AND PREEMPTION – HALL STREET ASSOCIATES
AND NAFTA TRADERS, INC. – A NATIONAL DEBATE WITH
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
J. KEATON GRUBBS*
JUSTIN R. BLOUNT**
KYLE C. POST***
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 13, 2011, the Texas Supreme Court, in construing the Texas
Arbitration Act, rejected the U. S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.1 At issue was whether the parties may by
agreement expand judicial review of an arbitration award beyond the specific
grounds for vacatur or modification set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.
In NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn2 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
Texas Arbitration Act does not preclude the parties from supplementing
judicial review by contract. A discussion on the reasoning of the Texas Court
and others that have addressed this issue, together with implications, is vital
to moving forward with contractual arbitration domestically and
internationally.
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) of 19253 prescribes the grounds
for confirmation, vacatur, or modification of an arbitration award. The
statutory grounds are set forth in §§ 9, 10 and 11 of the FAA.4 In Hall Street
Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the U. S. Supreme Court stated of these
statutory grounds:
Sections 10 and 11, after all, address egregious departures from the
parties’ agreed-upon arbitration: “corruption,” “fraud,” “evident
partiality,” “misconduct,” “misbehavior,” “exceed[ing] . . .
powers,” “evident material miscalculation,” “evident material
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1
552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
2
339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
3
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. All references to the FAA are to these provisions.
4
Id. §§ 9–11.
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mistake,” “award[s] upon a matter not submitted;” the only ground
with any softer focus is “imperfect[ions],” and a court may correct
those only if they go to “[a] matter of form not affecting the
merits.”5
In addition, a non-statutory ground for vacating an arbitral award was
developed in the courts as the doctrine of “manifest disregard.” The doctrine
arose in 1953 from language in Wilko v. Swan,6 where the Supreme Court
stated, “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest
disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation.”7 Generally, under the “manifest disregard” doctrine a court
manifestly disregards the law when an arbitrator knows of a clear legal
principle and refuses to apply it.8 In addition to “manifest disregard of the
law,” the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized a non-statutory
ground based on “public policy.”9
In Hall Street the U.S. Supreme Court ostensibly abolished all nonstatutory grounds for judicial review, including “manifest disregard” and
“public policy,” and held that, “[t]he FAA’s grounds for prompt vacatur and
modification of awards are exclusive for parties seeking expedited review
under the FAA.”10 In reaching this conclusion, the Court suggested that
“‘manifest disregard’ can be read as merely referring to the § 10 grounds
collectively, rather than adding to them . . . or as shorthand for the § 10
subsections authorizing vacatur when arbitrators were ‘guilty of misconduct’
or ‘exceeded their powers.’”11
The Circuit courts were in conflict over the exclusiveness of the FAA
provisions and the non-statutory doctrine of “manifest disregard” before
Hall, and some still question whether “manifest disregard” survived the Hall
Street decision.12 More importantly, the ruling in Hall Street is of great
significance to arbitration as an ADR process. Arbitration is a matter of
contract between the parties, and parties typically provide for judicial review
of the arbitral award in their agreement. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall
Street precludes any such agreement, and now the statutory grounds for
5

Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 586.
346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
7
Id. (italics added).
8
See Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 938-940 (2010); see generally
Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above The Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law
Standard”, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011).
9
See Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Services, Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2003).
10
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 576-78.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 583-85. See generally infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
6
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vacating or modifying an arbitration award under the FAA “are exclusive
and cannot be supplemented by contract.”13 The Court went on to say,
however, that:
In holding that §§10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the
review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they
exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
where judicial review of different scope is arguable. But here we
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under
§§9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.14
The larger issue then after Hall Street is whether and to what extent the
parties to an arbitration agreement can provide for judicial review either
beyond or narrower than the specific criteria in the FAA under the common
law or a state arbitration act. Furthermore, to what extent must all courts
follow Hall Street in light of the preemption doctrine? In Texas, these issues
have been answered in Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.15 In that case, the Texas
Supreme Court held that under the Texas General Arbitration Act (“TAA”)
parties can indeed contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards
and that such a conclusion is not preempted by the FAA or the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hall Street.16 This ruling appears to create a conflict in the
law of judicial review of arbitration awards, and the rulings in Nafta Traders
and other cases leave significant uncertainty for parties to arbitration
agreements. Part II of this Article discusses and analyzes the rationale and
ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Hall Street. Part III discusses
the aftermath of the Hall Street decision, particularly unanswered questions
that remain after that ruling was issued. Part IV discusses the rationale and
ruling of the Texas Supreme Court in Nafta Traders as it resolved the Texasspecific issues remaining after Hall Street. Part V discusses the issue of
preemption, and whether the result reached in Nafta Traders, as well as other
state courts, should be preempted by the ruling in Hall Street. Finally, Part V
discusses and analyzes the practical implications of these differing rulings,
and how knowledgeable counsel can deal with this conflict of law when
drafting arbitration agreements.
13

Id. at 577-78, 585-88. (emphasis added.)
Id. at 590-91.
15
339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
16
Id. at 97.
14
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II. THE FAA AND HALL STREET ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. V. MATTEL, INC.
The Hall Street litigation arose from a lease dispute between Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. (hereinafter “Hall Street”), which had leased property to
Mattel, Inc. (hereinafter “Mattel”) for use as a manufacturing facility.17 The
lease between the parties provided that Mattel would indemnify Hall Street
for any costs incurred as a result of Mattel, or any predecessor tenants, failing
to comply with environmental laws while operating manufacturing facilities
on the property.18 A test was conducted in 1998 on the property’s well water,
and high levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) were detected.19 The presence of
TCE was believed to be the result of manufacturing discharge by tenants
prior to Mattel, during the period between 1951 and 1980.20 An onsite
property examination by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
(hereinafter DEQ), identified pollutants in the well water on the property.21
As a result, Mattel ceased using well water and agreed to a consent order
with the DEQ to commence cleanup of the site.22 In 2001, Mattel notified
Hall Street of its intent to terminate the lease.23 In response, Hall Street filed
suit challenging Mattel’s notice to terminate the lease, particularly claiming
Mattel was obligated to indemnify Hall Street for cleanup costs incident to
the removal of TCE and other pollutants from the property.24 Trial was held
in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Oregon, and the trial court
ruled in favor of Mattel on the termination issue; however, by agreement the
parties agreed to submit the indemnification issue to arbitration.25 The
parties prepared an arbitration agreement and the trial court approved the
agreement.26 Specifically, the following provision was set forth in the
arbitration agreement:
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon may
enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or
by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s

17

Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 579.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
18
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findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii)
where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.27
At the conclusion of arbitration, Mattel received a favorable ruling, with
a finding that it had no obligation to indemnify Hall Street.28 The arbitrator
reasoned the lease directed Mattel to comply with all applicable federal, state
and local environmental laws, but did not specifically require Mattel to
comply with the testing requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality
Act.29
Hall Street then filed a motion to vacate, modify and/or correct the
arbitrator’s decision in District Court, urging it was legal error not to
consider the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act as an environmental law
requiring Mattel’s compliance under the terms of the subject lease.30 The
District Court agreed with Hall Street, vacated the arbitrator’s decision and
remanded the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings.31 On remand,
the arbitrator ruled in favor of Hall Street, concluding that the Oregon
Drinking Water Quality Act did constitute an environmental law under the
lease.32 Thereafter, both parties sought to modify portions of the arbitrator’s
decision in District Court; however, the arbitrator’s ruling on indemnification
in favor of Hall Street was upheld.33
Both parties then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.34 The
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Mattel, instructing the District Court on
remand to “‘return to the application to confirm the original arbitration award
(not the subsequent award revised after reversal), and . . . confirm that award,
unless . . . the award should be vacated on the grounds allowable under 9
U.S.C. Section 10, or modified or corrected under the grounds allowable
under 9 U.S.C. Section 11.’”35
On remand, the District Court ruled in favor of Hall Street.36 Following
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed again.37 The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiorari on the issue of whether the grounds for vacatur and
modification are exclusively identified in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.38
27

Id.
Id. at 580.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 581.
37
Id.
38
Id.
28
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As stated above, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision held that the
grounds stated in the FAA §§ 10 and 11 for either vacating, or modifying or
correcting an arbitration award constitute the exclusive grounds for expedited
vacatur and modification of an arbitration award pursuant to the FAA.39 The
majority opinion written by Justice Souter first recited the national policy
favoring arbitration and specific provisions of §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA
and also referenced the split in the Circuits over exclusivity and expansion by
agreement.40 The Court then proceeded to analyze Hall Street’s two main
arguments against exclusivity or in favor of expansion by agreement, which
were (i) that expandable judicial review authority has been accepted as the
law since Wilko v. Swan”41 and (ii) “that the agreement to review for legal
error ought to prevail simply because arbitration is a creature of contract, and
the FAA is ‘motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to
enforce agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered.’”42 The Court
generally took a narrow, strict view of the FAA language in § 9, noting that
“[u]nder the terms of § 9, a court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award
‘unless’ it is vacated, modified, or corrected ‘as prescribed’ in §§ 10 and
11.”43
On Hall Street’s first position, the Court stated that the “supposed”
expansion by judicial interpretation of the Wilko language on the part of the
various courts “is too much for Wilko to bear.”44 Rather, the Court ruled that
Wilko stood against general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors, and the
language with the term “manifest disregard” may have been intended for a
new ground, may merely have referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, or
may have been a shorthand for the terms “guilty of misconduct” or
“exceeded their powers” from the statutory language of the FAA.45
However, the Court found “no reason to accord it the significance that Hall
Street urges,” and ruled that the presence of this language in Wilko did not
mean that private parties could contract for greater judicial review that than
provided in the statute.46
On Hall Street’s second position, the Court also ruled that the argument
fell short. The Court agreed that the FAA:
lets parties tailor some, even many features of arbitration by
contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what their
39

Id.
Id. at 581-84.
41
Id. at 584.
42
Id. at 585.
43
Id. at 582.
44
Id. at 585.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with
procedure and choice of substantive law. But to rest this case on the
general policy of treating arbitration agreements as enforceable as
such would be to beg the question, which is whether the FAA has
textual features at odds with enforcing a contract to expand judicial
review following the arbitration.
To that particular question we think the answer is yes, that the
text compels a reading of §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive.47
The Court based its reasoning on statutory interpretation, including
reference to the old canon of construction ejusdem generis, which states that
in interpreting a statute, a general term is limited to or confined to coverage
of the specific terms it follows.48 The Court noted that the statutory sections
at issue did not even provide for “a textual hook for expansion” or a general
term to allow judicial expansion of the enumerated specific instances of
outrageous conduct to include “just any legal error.”49 The Court went on to
say that expanding the detailed categories goes against the clear language and
mandate of § 9, and Congress’ use of words such as “must grant” and
“prescribed” “does not sound remotely like a provision meant to tell a court
what to do just in case the parties say nothing else.”50 This led the Court to
the ultimate conclusion that:
Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three
provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.
Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and
evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review
process,” . . . and bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration
process.51
Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in a dissenting opinion which
focused on the FAA core purpose expressed in § 2 of the FAA “‘to abrogate
the common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements’”52 and to ensure “‘that private arbitration agreements are
47

Id.
Id. at 586.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 587.
51
Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
52
Id. at 593 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984)).
48
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enforced according to their terms.’”53 Justice Stevens argued that the
majority result conflicts with the FAA purpose and the statutory text does not
compel a reading or interpretation inconsistent with the overriding interest of
the FAA “in effectuating the clearly expressed intent of the contracting
parties.”54 He further argued that the majority’s decision was based in part on
“an assumption that Congress intended to include the words ‘and no other’ in
the grounds specified in §§ 10 and 11 for the vacatur and modification of
awards.”55

III. THE HALL STREET AFTERMATH – SCOPE AND
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Much controversy has surrounded the Hall Street decision. The courts
at the federal and state levels as well as commentators have joined the
debate. Two highly regarded commentators, Professor Rau at the University
of Texas and Professor Smit at Columbia University, critically reviewed the
opinion and differed on the correctness of the decision.56 Professor Rau
disagreed with the decision and reasoning,57 while Professor Smit agreed
with the decision but found fault in the Court’s rationale for the holding and
the unanswered questions it raised.58 The courts are in no less disarray.
What seems clear from the holding in Hall Street is that the grounds in
the FAA for vacatur, modification, or correction for judicial review of an
arbitral award rendered solely pursuant to the FAA are exclusive and may
not be expanded by the parties in an arbitration agreement. This ostensibly
laid to rest the general question and conflict over whether parties could
expand arbitral award judicial review by contract under the FAA. However,
the Court’s treatment of “manifest disregard;” the Court’s qualification of the
decision as only applying to FAA judicial review; and the Court’s statement
that other means to judicial review outside the FAA may exist, such as state

53
Id. (quoting Volt Information Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478, (1989)).
54
Id. at 595 (stating that “A listing of grounds that must always be available to contracting
parties simply does not speak to the question whether they may agree to additional grounds for
judicial review.”).
55
Id. at 594.
56
See Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (Special Section: Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.) 469 (2008); Hans Smit, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A
Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (Special Section: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc.) 513 (2008).
57
See Rau, supra note 56.
58
See Smit, supra note 56.
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statutes and common law, have led to what one commentator refers to as
“The Hall Street Hangover.”59
Generally, the FAA provisions and the court-developed common law
doctrines for judicial review of arbitral awards have co-existed since the
FAA enactment in 1925.60 The non-statutory vacatur doctrines have
included “manifest disregard,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “completely
irrational,” and “violation of public policy.”61 Other arguments outside of
the FAA but finding effect in the courts have included, “contained a factual
error,” “did not draw their essence from the agreement,” “had a punitive,
excessive, or unauthorized remedy,” “were unconstitutional,” “were invalid
because there was no arbitration agreement,” and “resulted from an
agreement to allow parties to expand and define their own standards of
review.”62 Thus, it was not unusual for courts to find extra-statutory bases
for review outside of the arbitration agreement, or to allow parties to contract
for a different standard of review for awards than that expressly set forth in
the FAA.
The Hall Street decision did not specifically say that all non-statutory,
common law, or contractual avenues for judicial review were abolished,
rendered null, or extinguished by its decision. Rather, the Court stated:
In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the
review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they
exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into the court for
parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
where judicial review of different scope is arguable. But here we
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§
9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement or arbitration awards.63
The most widely applied non-statutory standard in both federal and state
courts is “manifest disregard.”64 At least one view is that “manifest
59

See Codie Henderson, Note, Business Law—The Hall Street Hangover: Recovering and
Discovering Avenues for Review of Arbitration Awards; Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,
128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008), 10 WYO. L. REV. 299 (2010).
60
See LeRoy, supra note 8; see also Weston, supra note 8; Christopher R. Drahozal,
Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905 (2010).
61
Leroy, supra note 8, at 174.
62
Id. at 174-75.
63
Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
64
See generally Leroy, supra note 8 (setting forth research regarding the adoption of the
manifest disregard standard).
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disregard” has subsumed all non-statutory, common law grounds, except
perhaps “public policy.”65 Prior to Hall Street, all federal Circuit Courts had
adopted the “manifest disregard” ground as a possible basis for vacating an
arbitral award. The three possible sources for the courts’ understanding and
applying this ground have been:
1. As an independent, judicially created ground for review of
arbitration awards;
2. As a turn of phrase used in interpreting the §10 grounds for vacating
an award; and
3. As a synonym for FAA §10(a)(4) allowing vacatur where an
arbitrator “exceeded their powers.”66
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed “manifest disregard” specifically in
the Hall Street opinion, referring to the Wilko v. Swan case and language that
gave rise to the doctrine and further acknowledging the differences between
the Federal Circuit Courts regarding whether it is an independent ground for
review or a shorthand for certain statutory grounds. The Court stated:
Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new
ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the §10 grounds
collectively, rather than adding to them . . . Or, as some courts
have thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for §
10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the
arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their
powers.”67
The Federal Circuit Courts are now divided on whether “manifest
disregard,” in particular, or any other non-statutory, common law ground
survives the Hall Street decision.68 There are three ways the federal and state
courts have decided the issue since Hall Street:
1. The FAA grounds in § 10 are exclusive, and Hall Street abolished
“manifest disregard” as an independent ground for judicial review –
so the doctrine is eliminated and no longer available or applicable;
2. “Manifest disregard” is a “judicial gloss” for all of the § 10 grounds
for vacatur – so the court could still apply existing precedent as long

65

Id.
Id. at 160-73; Weston, supra note 8, at 941-45.
67
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585.
68
Leroy, supra note 8, at 180.
66
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as the reasoning did not extend beyond one of the enumerated
grounds; and
3. “Manifest disregard” is shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4) – so
that the court could still apply existing precedent to it as a statutory
ground.69
The breakdown of the split between the Federal Circuit Courts reflects
that the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the “abolished” line of
reasoning.70 The Second Circuit continues to apply the doctrine under the
“judicial gloss” reasoning.71 The Ninth Circuit continues to apply the
doctrine under the “shorthand” reasoning.72 The First, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits have expressed hints or views in dicta or unpublished opinions but
have not directly addressed and expressed their positions.73 The remaining
Third, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have not yet written on the
question.74
The state courts that have addressed the question of contractual judicial
expansion and a non-statutory or common law ground, particularly “manifest
disregard,” are also divided on approach. The Alabama Supreme Court has
adopted the “abolished” position and supplemental grounds are no longer
applicable.75 Colorado questions the applicability of any non-statutory bases
after Hall Street.76 California, Wisconsin, and Indiana courts have ruled or
assumed that “manifest disregard” still survives under one or the other of the
above approaches.77 In May 2011, Texas addressed the issue of contractual
agreements to expand judicial review in the Nafta Traders decision.

IV. THE TAA AND NAFTA TRADERS, INC. V. QUINN
In May, 2011, the Texas Supreme Court handed down its decision in
NAFTA Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.78 The Court directly addressed the holding in
Hall Street in light of the TAA.79 The TAA provides for confirming, vacatur,
69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Volvo Trucks N.A., Inc. v. Dolphin Line, Inc., 50 So.3d 1050 (Ala. 2010).
76
Barnett v. Elite Props., No. 09CA0693, 2010 WL 2105940, at *6 (Colo. App. May 27,
2010).
77
Leroy, supra note 8, at 181.
78
339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
79
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 171.001 - .098. All references to the TAA are to
these provisions.
70
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and modification of arbitral awards on grounds nearly identical to those in §§
10 and 11 of the FAA. The provision of the TAA that corresponds to § 9 in
the FAA states that “[u]nless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or
correcting an award under section 171.088 or 171.091 [of the TAA], the
court, on application of a party, shall confirm the award.”80 Applying the
TAA, the Texas Supreme Court reached a different conclusion than the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hall Street, and in rejecting Hall Street the Texas high
court decided that the criteria in the TAA were not exclusive and the parties
could supplement judicial review in the arbitration agreement.81
Prior to the litigation leading to the decision in Nafta Traders, Margaret
Quinn (“Quinn”) was Vice President of Operations for Nafta Traders, Inc.
(“Nafta Traders”), an international re-distributor of athletic apparel and
footwear.82 Quinn was terminated by Nafta Traders when the company
reduced its workforce in response to declining business.83 Quinn sued Nafta
Traders, alleging her termination was motivated by sex discrimination.84 The
handbook for employees of Nafta Traders required binding arbitration to
resolve disputes arising incident to the employment relationship; however,
the handbook did not specify whether state or federal law would apply.85
Nafta Traders responded to Quinn’s lawsuit by moving to compel arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act.86 Quinn did not object, and an agreed
order was signed directing the parties to arbitration.87
Following arbitration, Quinn received an award of $30,000 in back pay,
$30,000 in mental anguish damages, $29,031 in “special damages,” $104,828
in attorney fees, and costs.88 Quinn filed a motion to confirm the arbitration
decision under the TAA.89 In response, Nafta Traders moved for vacatur
under the FAA, the TAA, common law, and a section captioned
“Arbitration” of the Nafta Traders’ employee handbook, which provided in
relevant part:
The arbitrator does not have authority (i) to render a decision which
contains a reversible error of state or federal law, or (ii) to apply a

80

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.087.
Nafta Traders, 339 S.W.3d at 101 (Tex. 2011).
82
Id. at 87.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 87-88.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
81

Spring 2014/Grubbs, et al./13

cause of action or remedy not expressly provided for under existing
state or federal law.90
Nafta Traders argued that the agreement on the limitations of the
arbitrator’s authority effectively expanded the narrow scope of judicial
review otherwise allowed by the TAA and FAA.91 As specific grounds for
vacatur, Nafta Traders contended that (i) the arbitrator improperly applied
federal sex discrimination law to Quinn’s claim, although she had only
alleged violation of state law; (ii) the evidence was factually insufficient to
support a finding of sex discrimination; (iii) the attorneys fee award was
improper; (iv) the “special damages” award was a double recovery of lost
wages; and (v) the evidence did not support a recovery of mental anguish
damages.92 The District Court confirmed the arbitrator’s award without
comment on Nafta Traders’ complaints and Nafta Traders appealed.93 The
Dallas Court of Appeals applied the TAA rather than the FAA, but decided
that the similarity of the two statutes justified construing the TAA like the
U.S. Supreme Court construed the FAA in Hall Street.94 The Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court ruling that “‘parties seeking judicial review
of an arbitration award covered under the TAA cannot contractually agree to
expand the scope of that review and are instead limited to judicial review
based on the statutory grounds enumerated in the statute.’”95
Nafta Traders also argued in the Court of Appeals that the arbitrator
exceeded his power by issuing an erroneous award when the arbitration
agreement expressly denied his authority to commit reversible error or apply
an action or remedy contrary to state or federal law.96 The argument
implicated a statutory ground in section 171.088(a)(3)(A) of the TAA.97 The
Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the argument by saying that an arbitrator
exceeds his power by deciding issues not submitted to arbitration but not by
deciding submitted issues erroneously.98 The Court further expressed that
Nafta Traders was trying to invoke the ground to accomplish indirectly what
Hall Street already determined Nafta Traders could not do directly, that is

90

Id.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 88-89.
94
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court decided Hall Street after oral argument in Nafta Traders but
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expand judicial review by contract.99 The Court concluded that none of
Nafta Traders’ arguments fell within a statutory ground.100
Nafta appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, and Justice Hecht delivered
the opinion of the Court. In a 9-0 decision, the Court addressed two principal
questions: whether the TAA, like the FAA (as decided in Hall Street),
“precludes an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for
reversible error, and if not, whether the FAA preempts enforcement of such
an agreement.”101 The Court answered both in the negative and reversed the
Court of Appeals.102
On the first issue, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that it must
follow Hall Street in applying the FAA, but the Court stated that it would
make its own judgment in construing the TAA.103 The Court’s rationale
began with the specific ground for vacatur or modification of an award found
in the TAA, that “the arbitrators … exceeded their powers.”104 Furthermore,
the Court noted that “‘[a]n arbitrator derives his power from the parties’
agreement to submit to arbitration.’”105 The Texas Supreme Court quoted the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp,106 as follows:
Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an
arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give effect to the
contractual rights and expectations of the parties. In this endeavor,
as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control. This is
because an arbitrator derives his or her powers from the parties’
agreement to forgo the legal process and submit their disputes to
private dispute resolution.107
Quinn argued that the agreement limiting the arbitrator’s authority was
in effect broadening judicial review of the arbitration award just like the
agreement in Hall Street.108 She argued that this is not permitted under the
TAA for the same reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court recited in Hall Street
regarding the FAA.109 The Texas Supreme Court noted that the U.S.
99
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Supreme Court based its decision on the textual framework of the FAA and
the policy favoring limited review expressed in the FAA’s statutory
language110 and that the parties and the Court in Hall Street framed the issue
as “expandable judicial review authority.”111 However, the Texas Supreme
Court viewed the agreement in Nafta Traders as the “flip-side” to such a
frame, “limited arbitral decision-making authority.”112
Even though the parties in Hall Street did not couch their agreement in
the specific terms of limited authority in an award that was not supported by
the law, that was the practical effect of what they were attempting to do. The
Hall Street parties were therefore attempting to do indirectly what the Nafta
Traders parties were doing directly – limit the arbitrator’s authority.113 In
Hall Street, the U.S. Supreme Court did not discuss FAA § 10(a)(4), which
provides for vacatur for an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers like the
TAA provision in § 171.088(a)(3)(A). The Texas Supreme Court held that
this section undercuts the U.S. Supreme Court’s textual analysis,114 reasoning
that if the parties agree that the arbitrator’s authority shall be limited to that
of a judge to not reach a decision based on reversible error, “in other words,
that an arbitrator should have no more power than a judge,” then a motion to
vacate for exceeding that authority is “firmly grounded in the text of Section
10.”115 According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning, an arbitrator can
never exceed his or her power by committing reversible error within § 10,
regardless of the parties’ agreement. Whether this reasoning is “at odds with
expanded judicial review depends on whether the right to contract to
circumscribe arbitral authority includes limiting the authority to err in
decision-making.”116 According to the Texas Supreme Court, the ultimate
question was “whether parties can agree to limit an arbitrator’s power to
err.”117
The Texas Supreme Court proceeded to discuss the U.S. Supreme
Court’s policy declarations for the FAA in Hall Street, predominantly
“limited review” and “resolving disputes straightaway” – couched as
expeditious resolution of claims.118 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this
reasoning and cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s own repeated affirmations that
“the principal purpose of the FAA is to ensure that private arbitration
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agreements are enforced according to their terms.”119 A policy of limited
judicial review in an agreement would be inimical to such purpose as well as
the “national policy favoring arbitration” established by Congress in the
FAA.120
According to the Texas Supreme Court’s rationale, searching for a
policy rationale to the Hall Street reasoning was unavailing, so the
consideration came back to the statutory text, and the Court stated:
The problem comes down to this. Under the TAA (and the FAA),
an arbitration award must be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds his
powers. Generally, an arbitrator’s powers are determined by
agreement of the parties. Can the parties agree that an arbitrator
has no more power than a judge, so that his decision is subject to
review, the same as a judicial decision? Hall Street answers no,
based on an analysis of the FAA’s text that ignores the provision
that raises the problem, and a policy that may the at odds with the
national policy favoring arbitration. With great respect, we are
unable to conclude that Hall Street’s analysis of the FAA provides
a persuasive basis for construing the TAA the same way.
[W]e agree that delay and resulting expense are concerns that
arbitration is intended, at least, to alleviate. But equally grievous is
a post-arbitration process that refuses to correct errors as the parties
intended, and of equal concern is a civil justice system that allows
parties an alternative to litigation only if they are willing to risk an
unreviewable decision. 121
The Texas Supreme Court went on to reaffirm Texas policy and law adhering
to broad freedom of contract and found nothing in the TAA conflicting with
the policy, stating:
On the contrary, the purpose of the TAA is to facilitate arbitration
agreements. . . . Specifically, the TAA contains no policy against
parties’ agreeing to limit the authority of an arbitrator to that of a
judge, but rather, an express provision requiring vacatur when
“arbitrators [have] exceeded their powers.” . . . Accordingly, we
hold that the TAA presents no impediment to an agreement that
limits the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus
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allows for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible
error.122
The Texas Court thus declined to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning
from Hall Street and held that the TAA did not preclude an arbitration
agreement from limiting the arbitrator’s authority in deciding a matter and
allowing judicial review of an award for reversible error.123

V. PREEMPTION
A. The Preemption Ruling in Nafta Traders
The second broad question addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in
Nafta Traders was whether its decision and accompanying rule for the TAA
was preempted by the FAA and the contrary holding in Hall Street. The
agreement in NAFTA Traders was covered by both state and federal law,
since the parties did not specifically choose one or the other. When both
laws apply, the Texas Supreme Court held that “state law is preempted ‘to
the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law – that is, to the extent that
it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”124 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court
held that because the provision for expanded judicial review did not directly
conflict with the federal policy of enforcing arbitration clauses enshrined in
the FAA, it was not preempted.125
The Texas Supreme Court relied extensively on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s explanation of the FAA’s preemptive effect in Volt Info. Sciences,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.126 In Volt, the parties
chose California law to govern their arbitration agreement.127 The California
law contained a provision that allowed a stay of arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation,128 while the FAA contained no such
provision.129 As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state law was
not preempted, concluding that the FAA’s purpose is not defeated by
conducting arbitration under state-law procedures different from the federal
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statute.130 The Texas Supreme Court seized upon the following language in
that case:
While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encourage
the expeditious resolution of disputes, its passage “was motivated,
first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements
into which parties had entered.” Accordingly, we have recognized
that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have
not agreed to do so, . . . nor does it prevent parties who do agree to
arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the scope of their
arbitration agreement. It simply requires courts to enforce privately
negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in
accordance with their terms.131
The Texas Supreme Court construed the language to mean that “FAApreemption is aimed at state-law hindrances to enforcement of arbitration
agreements not applicable to contracts generally.”132 Specifically, the court
held that:
The FAA only preempts the TAA if: (1) the agreement is in
writing, (2) it involves interstate commerce, (3) it can withstand
scrutiny under traditional contract defenses under state law, and (4)
state law affects the enforceability of the agreement. . . . The mere
fact that a contract affects interstate commerce, thus triggering the
FAA, does not preclude enforcement under the TAA as well. For
the FAA to preempt the TAA, state law must refuse to enforce an
arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce, either because
(1) the TAA has expressly exempted the agreement from coverage,
or (2) the TAA has imposed an enforceability requirement not
found in the FAA.133
The lesson from Volt, according to the Texas Supreme Court is “that the
FAA does not preempt all state-law impediments to arbitration; it preempts
state-law impediments to arbitration agreements.”134 In light of Volt, the
Texas Supreme Court did not read the Hall Street opinion as displacing the
principal basis of preemption as protection of parties’ arbitration agreements.
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This is particularly true in view of the U.S. Supreme Court’s language in
Hall Street, which states:
In holding that [FAA] §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for
the review provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that
they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example,
where judicial review of different scope is arguable. But here we
speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§
9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for
judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.135
Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court’s construction of the TAA that
allows agreements to enlarge judicial review is not an impediment to the
enforcement of the parties’ agreement, but rather advances the enforcement
of the agreement according to the intentions and expectations of the parties.
In addition, the Hall Street opinion expressly contemplates that the FAA will
not preempt state law allowing expanded judicial review.
The Texas Supreme Court did not stop with the answering of the two
primary questions. After determining that the TAA allowed expanded
judicial review by agreement and that the TAA was not preempted by the
FAA in this regard, the Texas Supreme Court concluded the opinion with
qualifications and caveats. Mere choice of the TAA to govern the agreement
or specifically choosing not to be governed by the FAA does not provide
expanded judicial review. “The matter is left to the agreement of the parties.
. . . [A]bsent clear agreement, the default under the TAA, and the only course
permitted by the FAA, is restricted judicial review.”136 Furthermore, a mere
agreement for expanded judicial review is in itself not enough. The parties
must ensure a sufficient record of the proceedings and complaints must have
been preserved as if the award was a judgment going up on appeal.
Additionally, the parties may not agree to a different standard of review than
would be applicable to a judicial appeal.137

B. Preemption Issues Going Forward
Open preemption issues remain with respect to the scope of judicial
review of arbitration awards. Will the conclusion of the Texas Supreme
135
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Court on the issue of preemption be followed by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Will choice of law provisions where parties specifically choose state
arbitration law as the basis for judicial review of an award be followed, or
will they be preempted by federal law? Do FAA §§ 9-11 apply exclusively
in federal courts, but not in state courts? The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on these specific preemption issues and its previous rulings on
preemption and the FAA have been somewhat confusing and conflicting,
making it difficult to determine how these issues will be resolved. While the
language in Hall Street indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court may be open to
the preemption reasoning utilized in Nafta Traders allowing expanded
judicial review, the method of statutory construction used by the Court in
Hall Street can easily lead to the opposite conclusion – that expanded judicial
review is preempted, in both state and federal court, if the arbitration at issue
is subject to the FAA.
In Hall Street, the U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily, and almost
exclusively, upon the text of the statute itself in reaching its conclusion. The
text of the particular sections of the FAA at issue can be interpreted as an
indicator of express Congressional intent to preempt state law and establish a
national standard for both state and federal courts reviewing arbitration
awards:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply
to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and
thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11
of this title.138
Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court did give credence to the fact that
more expansive judicial review under state statutes was “arguable,”139 their
own method of strict and literal construction of the statutory language would
seem to eliminate that argument. The language of this provision, taken at
face value, appears to expressly state that all arbitration awards covered by
the FAA may only be modified, corrected, or vacated as set forth in the FAA.
There is no indication in this provision of intent to allow an applicable state
statute or the common law to undercut this policy. The U.S. Supreme Court
has not yet addressed whether §§ 9-11 of the FAA apply to state courts.140
138
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Some commentators have asserted that by their terms, these provisions
should be interpreted as applying only to federal courts, and have no, or very
limited, applicability to FAA cases in state court.141 However, a strict
reading of the statute does not support such a conclusion.
Section 9 of the FAA does not refer only to judicial review by federal
courts, it refers to any court that the parties specify, and then proceeds to
state that any such court “must grant” an order confirming the award, except
for the reasons set forth in §§ 10 & 11. Thus, while FAA §§ 10 and 11
specifically reference only federal courts,142 they are incorporated by
reference in § 9, which applies those sections to any court specified by the
parties.143 If the U.S. Supreme Court continues to construe this provision as
literally as it did in Hall Street, then it would appear that the proper
interpretation of this provision is that it requires any court, not just federal
courts, specified by the parties to enter a judgment confirming the award
unless the statutory reasons for vacatur or modification are met. If this
language is as mandatory and dogmatic as the Hall Street opinion makes it
out to be, any state arbitration statute which allows for more expansive
judicial review is in direct conflict with this statutory language and is
arguably preempted if the FAA also applies to the arbitration agreement at
issue.
Indeed, language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street would
seem to support such an approach. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
stated that §§ 9-11 of the FAA set forth a “national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”144 If the standard of
judicial review of an arbitration award can be modified simply by seeking
enforcement under a state statute that allows a lower standard of review, such
a “national policy” could hardly be fulfilled.
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The only exception one could arguably find in the language of the
statute is that it expressly refers only to courts which the parties have
specified in their agreement.145 The language of this provision is not limited
to federal courts. This is clear from the fact that the provision later expressly
discusses that if no such election is made by the parties, then application for
enforcement of an award can be made to a federal court.146 Thus, while FAA
§ 9 clearly applies to state courts, it can be argued to apply only to state
courts specified by the parties in the arbitration agreement. If this is truly
what the statute says, then the results from such an interpretation are quite
bizarre. Parties wishing to contract for expanded judicial review under state
law would essentially be penalized for using a forum selection clause.
If the parties to the agreement contract for a specific state’s standard of
judicial review to apply but do not include a forum selection clause, then
they would have the opportunity for expanded judicial review, but only if
there was no basis for removal to federal court. If the case is removed to
federal court, and if § 9 of the FAA means what its text appears to mean,
then the federal court is bound to apply the exclusive standard of judicial
review found in §§ 10-11. However, if the parties utilize a forum selection
clause which states the award may only be enforced in a particular state
court, the result under § 9 would be that by specifically choosing a state
court, you have essentially contracted for the exclusive federal court standard
of review. Under such a strict interpretation of § 9, the only time the parties
could have the standard of judicial review that they desire is when they
contract for a specific state law to apply, fail to contract for a specific state
forum, and there is no basis for federal court jurisdiction. Such a result
seems nonsensical, and obviously does not fulfill the federal policy of
ensuring “the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements
to operate.”147
Following the rigid statutory interpretation utilized in Hall Street would
appear to indicate that the above result is correct. If the text of FAA § 9 is to
be strictly applied, then it is difficult to reach another result. The only
arguments that remain are that either Congress did not really mean that § 9
applies only to state courts when the parties specifically name the court, but
applies to all cases governed by the FAA regardless of the forum, or that
Congress intended for these provisions to apply only to federal courts.
Neither of these interpretations appears to be the most accurate reading of
this statute, although both of these alternative readings lead to more sensible
results.
145
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The conclusion that §§ 9-11 of the FAA have some, or even complete,
preemptive effect, whether in state and federal court or only in federal court,
is not precluded by prior Supreme Court precedence holding that the FAA
does not completely preempt state arbitration law. The Supreme Court has
held that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it
reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”148
However, this broad, sweeping language refers only to the substantive
provisions of the FAA dealing with how arbitration provisions are enforced,
not with judicial enforcement of rulings after arbitration has been held.149
Commentators have referred to this distinction as the “front end” and “back
end” of arbitration.150 The U.S. Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged
that such a distinction is relevant, as the pre-emptive effect of the statute
need not be determined by the statute as a whole; the analysis can and should
be done on a provision by provision basis.151
The Texas Supreme Court relied heavily on the Volt opinion in
determining that the FAA did not preempt the result in Nafta Traders.
However, Volt was also a “front end” arbitrability claim. In that case, the
Supreme Court took great care to point out that it involved enforcing the
parties’ agreement with respect to how they could arbitrate their claims and
that their choice to use state law rather than the FAA was not in conflict with
the policies of the FAA.152 However, the policies undergirding the FAA
which were discussed in that case were entirely different than the policies
expressed by the Court in Hall Street with respect to judicial review. If the
purpose of the FAA with respect to judicial review truly is to create a
“national policy” favoring limited judicial review,153 it is not at all clear that
148
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the policies and reasoning discussed in Volt and other preemption cases
discussing these “front end” preemption issues are even relevant to the
preemption analysis in cases involving the “back end” issue of judicial
review.
Ultimately, when the U.S. Supreme Court addresses a case on this issue,
the result will be determined by whether the Court takes a more policy-based
approach or textualist approach to the interpretation of the statute and its
preemptive effect. The make-up of the Court has changed since the ruling in
the Hall Street decision, but five of the justices in the majority from Hall
Street are still on the Court as of the time of this writing. However, further
changes to the Court may occur by the time this issue comes before it. The
optimal result would be for the Court to take a more policy-based approach,
and rule that parties can indeed contract for enforcement of any arbitration
award under the state law of their choice and that the FAA does not preempt
such a result. This result gives parties more contractual options with respect
to how their agreements will be enforced, providing them with valuable
flexibility. However, given the result and method of analysis utilized in Hall
Street, it is far from clear that the result reached in Nafta Traders and other
state courts will be followed by the U.S. Supreme Court when it finally
addresses this important issue.

C. International Dimensions
While a full treatment of the subject is outside the scope of this Article,
it bears noting that the issue of preemption is further obfuscated when
international dimensions are considered. The United States has adopted the
Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958
(hereinafter the “New York Convention”), which governs the enforceability
of international commercial arbitration awards.154 An arbitration award falls
under the New York Convention when it involves a legal relationship that is
considered commercial and either one or more of the parties is not a United
States citizen or the relationship “involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states.”155 The scope of this provision applying the
New York Convention is quite broad, and thus the New York Convention
could potentially apply to two United States citizens who have arbitrated
domestically with respect to an international issue.
In spite of the fact that the New York Convention was adopted over
forty years ago, commentators have noted that “there is still an absence of
154
155
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consensus on the application of the Convention.”156 Although domestic
courts have been consistent in the application of the New York Convention
to arbitrations conducted abroad for which enforcement is sought in the
United States, courts have been less consistent in their application of the New
York Convention to international arbitrations conducted domestically.157
While the terms of the FAA clearly apply the New York Convention to
international arbitrations conducted within the United States, domestic courts
have still often applied Chapter 1 of the FAA (relating to domestic
arbitrations) rather than applying the New York Convention via Chapter 2.158
This confusion and inconsistency in the application of the New York
Convention adds an extra layer of problems to the domestic issues with
preemption already discussed. For example, suppose two United States
citizens have a contractual dispute regarding international property, and the
terms of the contract require arbitration of the dispute within the United
States. Further, suppose that the parties have contracted for application of
Texas law to apply to the contract, exclusive enforcement under the TAA,
and expanded judicial review. A court, whether state or federal, would have
three potential standards of judicial review to apply – Chapter 1 of the FAA,
the New York Convention via Chapter 2 of the FAA (which may or may not
allow for expanded judicial review),159 or the expanded judicial review
contracted for by the parties via the TAA. In this situation, the issue of
preemption is once again critical to whether the parties will receive the
expanded judicial review in their contract.
Under its express terms, it appears that Chapter 2 of the FAA should
apply, which requires enforcement of the award under the New York
Convention. The language of Chapter 2 with respect to the bases for review
is mandatory, like that of Chapter 1, and states that courts “shall” confirm
unless there is a ground for refusal under the New York Convention.160 If the
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reasoning of Hall Street is applied to this provision and the bases for review
under the New York Convention, then the result would be that expanded
judicial review would not be allowed. The question then is whether the
reasoning of Hall Street should also be applied to the New York Convention.
Since the bases for vacating an award under the New York Convention are
relatively similar to those found in the FAA, if the parties are not allowed to
have the expanded judicial review they contracted for, the result would
essentially be the same as if the court had applied Chapter 1 of the FAA.161
If the court decides that despite its terms Chapter 2 of the FAA does not
apply, once again the issue of whether Chapter 1 of the FAA preempts
enforcement under the TAA will determine whether expanded judicial
review is allowed.

VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The implications of the rulings in Hall Street and Nafta Traders and the
resulting preemption issues are substantial for parties drafting arbitration
agreements. Due to the uncertainty of how the issue of preemption will be
resolved, there is no “safe” course of action for contract drafters. If parties
attempt to be very thorough and precise in how they draft their arbitration
agreement, they can potentially draft themselves into a corner, as discussed
above.162 Parties may seek a safe harbor for the expanded judicial review
that they desire by including both choice of law and forum selection clauses,
but the forum selection clause may have the opposite of its intended effect
and force application of the limited judicial review of the FAA. Thus, how
the arbitration agreement is drafted depends largely upon how the drafter
feels this issue will be resolved by the Supreme Court. Given the
schizophrenic nature of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on this issue,
predicting how it will ultimately be resolved is difficult.
In Texas and other states that have expressly stated that expanded
judicial review by contract is allowable and not preempted by the FAA, the
best course of action appears to be to draft the arbitration agreement with an
express choice of law provision providing for exclusive enforcement under
state arbitration law and a forum selection clause requiring that the award
may only be enforced in that state’s court. Such provisions are generally
given effect, and can be used to prevent the enforcement action from ending
up in federal court, where the preemption of the state law by the FAA is
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or
enforcement of the award specified in said Convention.”).
161
Irvani and Reisman, supra note 159 at 19 (noting that the bases for vacatur of the domestic
award track those set forth in Article V of the New York Convention).
162
See supra Part V.

Spring 2014/Grubbs, et al./27

more likely. Courts in states like Texas which have rejected the Hall Street
reasoning under state law are required to follow the precedent established by
their own high court over any contrary federal precedent other than the U.S.
Supreme Court, and thus the wishes of the parties will be followed unless
and until the U.S. Supreme Court

